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ABSTRACT 
Although regulators have severe concerns about whether the lack of competition in the 
audit market may reduce audit quality, existing research provides conflicting empirical results on 
whether competition directly reduces audit quality. In this paper, I employ a novel approach: 
structural equation modeling (SEM) to construct a latent variable to measure audit quality and 
also use SEM to simultaneously assess both the construct of audit quality and the overall (both 
direct and indirect) effects of audit market competition on audit quality. I find that greater audit 
market competition significantly increases audit quality and that it has significant moderation 
effects on audit quality through auditor independence, indicated by the provision of non-audit 
services (NAS) and auditor-client tenure. Specifically, audit market competition negatively 
moderates the inverse relationship between auditor-client tenure and audit quality. In contrast, 
competition has a positive moderation effect on the inverse association between the provision of 
NAS and audit quality. I also discover that audit market competition affects audit quality 
indirectly through enhanced auditor independence. Further, the results in the measurement model 
show that internal control weaknesses, going-concern opinions, restatements, and security class 
action filings are great proxies for audit quality, while discretionary accruals do not capture audit 
quality well. The findings of the study not only offer a potential explanation for the mixed results 
found in prior research, but also provide insightful evidence for regulatory policies on audit 
market competition. 
KEYWORD: Competition, Auditor Independence, Audit Quality, Tenure, Non-audit Services 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The audit market has attracted considerable attention and debate from policymakers and 
practitioners because of its unique characteristics: mandated demand and concentrated supply 
(Gerakos & Syverson, 2015). Big Four audit firms (Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG, and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers) have dominated the audit market in the U.S. and around the world 
(Audit Analytics, 2014). For example, more than ninety-nine percent of Fortune 100 and ninety-
eight percent of FTSE 350 companies are audited by the Big Four audit firms, resulting in a 
highly concentrated audit market (Agnew, 2016; Carousel, 2014). Policymakers and regulators 
have raised concerns about the potential effects of the concentrated audit market on auditor 
independence and audit quality (General Accounting Office (GAO) 2003, 2008; United States 
Treasury, 2008). The concern is that the lack of audit market competition (i.e., high audit market 
concentration) limits clients’ choice of auditors and encourages auditors to take a less-skeptical 
approach to the audit, resulting in lower audit quality (GAO, 2008). In 2011, a concept paper 
proposed mandatory auditor rotation as a possible remedy. However, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) faced fierce resistance to mandatory auditor rotation. 
Opponents claimed that a concentrated audit market does not reduce audit quality and may even 
improve audit quality; thus mandatory auditor rotation may decrease audit quality. In 2013, after 
nearly three years of debate, the mandatory auditor rotation proposal in the U.S. was finally 
abandoned (Ryan, 2014).  
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 But the debate on audit market competition continues. Is there a trade-off between 
competition and audit quality? How does audit market competition affect audit quality? Does 
competition have an indirect impact on audit quality? Prior research, which examines only the 
direct effect of audit market competition on audit quality, provides conflicting results. Therefore, 
in this paper, I investigate moderating indirect effects of audit market competition on audit 
quality in the United States, in particular through auditor independence. This study contributes 
both to current regulation debates and to a growing body of research on audit market competition 
and audit quality.  
 Finance and accounting theories offer different perspectives on the role of competition. 
The competition-monitoring view holds that greater competition aligns the interests of the agent 
(e.g., manager) and the principal (e.g., shareholder)and so reduces agency cost, resulting in a 
reduction in managers' slackness and improved efficiency (Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997; Griffiths, 
2001). Similarly, a competitive audit market may align the interests of both auditors and clients' 
shareholders and encourage auditors to be more independent and provide a higher quality of 
audit to keep their reputation capital. The competition-impairment view, however, argues that 
greater competition may reduce a company's profit margin, encouraging management to take 
more risk in order to increase market share and maintain profitability (Keeley, 1990; Allen & 
Gale, 2000a, 2000b, 2004; Repullo, 2004). Furthermore, Beams and Killough (1970) state that 
auditors' economic dependence on their customers is stronger when the audit market is more 
competitive. Applying this premise to the audit market, intensive competition may put 
substantial negative pressure on auditors to improve profitability, increasing their incentives to 
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take a higher risk and please their customers by compromising their independence, resulting in 
lower audit quality (Beams & Killough, 1970; Allen & Gale, 2004).  
 Empirical research provides conflicting results on the impact of audit market competition 
on audit quality, arguably reflecting challenges to measuring audit quality and insufficient 
knowledge of the overall (both direct and indirect) impact of audit market competition. While a 
few studies investigate the direct effect of competition on audit quality and provide mixed 
evidence, less is known about its indirect effects. Auditor independence is the cornerstone of the 
value and credibility of an external audit and thus is perceived as an important and direct factor 
in guaranteeing high audit quality. Both auditor independence and market competition are linked 
to audit quality individually in the literature (Frankel, Johnson, & Nelson, 2002; Numan & 
Willekens, 2012; Koh, Rajgopal, & Srinivasan, 2013). As represented in the overall market 
environment, audit market competition may also have important potential indirect effects on the 
association between auditor independence and audit quality. However, whether audit market 
competition has indirect effects on audit quality through auditor independence remains an 
unexplored question.  
 As audit quality is an unobservable variable, studies have widely used five proxies for 
audit quality: discretionary accruals (Francis & Krishnan, 1999; Frankel, et al., 2002; Ashbaugh, 
LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003; Kallapur, Sankaraguruswamy, & Zang, 2010; Boone, Khurana, & 
Raman, 2012), going-concern opinions (DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002; Lim & 
Tan, 2008; Li, 2009), restatements (Kinney, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2004; Paterson & Valencia, 
2011; Schmidt, 2012), security class action filings (Lennox & Li, 2014; Rajgopal, Srinivasan, & 
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Zheng, 2015), and internal control weaknesses (Newton, Persellin, Wang, & Wilkins, 2015; 
Chen, Peng, Xue, Yang, & Ye, 2016). Using different proxies for audit quality may generate 
different results for the impact of audit market competition on audit quality. For example, 
Newton, Wang, and Wilkins (2013) find a positive association between audit market 
concentration and audit quality, indicated by the likelihood of restatement, while Boone et al. 
(2012) find audit market concentration to be negatively related to audit quality using a different 
proxy: discretionary accruals. As emphasized by DeFond and Zhang (2014), because there is no 
consensus on which measures of audit quality are best, the proxies for audit quality should be 
validated and evaluated.    
 To address these issues, I employ structural equation modeling (SEM) to investigate both 
direct and indirect effects of audit market competition on audit quality through auditor 
independence. Because of several significant advantages of SEM over other methodologies (e.g., 
regression), SEM offers an appropriate and powerful analysis methodology, allowing the 
measurement of the unobservable variable (the latent variable) audit quality using several 
observable measures, and to control for measurement errors, while simultaneously testing both 
measurement and structural models.  
Using a sample of U.S. public companies from the period between 2004 and 2014, I first 
employ confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to the measurement model to construct a latent 
variable, audit quality, indicated by five commonly used audit quality proxies—discretionary 
accruals (DAC), going concern opinions (GC), restatements (RESTATE), securities class action 
filings (SAC), and internal control weaknesses (ICW)—which allows me to evaluate these 
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proxies for audit quality. After validating the measures of audit quality, I use the SEM approach 
to simultaneously examine the construct of the latent variable, audit quality, but also both the 
direct and indirect effects of audit market competition on audit quality through auditor 
independence, as indicated by the provision of non-audit services and auditor-client tenure.  
 I find significant indirect effects of audit market competition on the association between 
audit quality and auditor independence. Audit market competition not only has a positive and 
significant direct impact on audit quality but also has significant moderating effects through 
auditor independence. In particular, audit market competition has a positively moderating effect 
on the negative association between the provision of non-audit services (NAS) and audit quality, 
indicating that the provision of non-audit services reduces audit quality less as audit market 
competition increases, which supports the competition-monitoring view. In a competitive audit 
market, the adverse impact of NAS to audit quality decreases, suggesting that auditors must 
demonstrate a higher quality of services both in audit and NAS to maintain those auditor-client 
relationship. In contrast, audit market competition negatively moderates the negative association 
between auditor-client tenure and audit quality. That is, long auditor-client tenure reduces audit 
quality to a greater extent as audit market competition increases, which is consistent with the 
competition-impairment view.  When market competition for audit clients is higher, audit firms 
are more likely to retain their audit clients by pleasing their clients, which resulting in impaired 
independence and lower audit quality. Furthermore, the results of additional tests of the indirect 
effects of audit market competition show that competition indirectly increases audit quality 
through enhanced auditor independence.  
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 The findings of the measurement model provide supporting evidence that GC, RESTATE, 
SAC, and ICW measure audit quality well. In particular, among the four, ICW is the best proxy. 
However, DAC is insignificantly related to the latent variable audit quality in the measurement 
model, suggesting that caution needs to be used when DAC is used to proxy for audit quality. 
 This study contributes both to regulation decisions and to the existing body of accounting 
and auditing research in several ways. First, this study advances the theoretical framework on 
audit quality by incorporating the overall audit environment, audit market competition, and 
provides a comprehensive understanding of its role. Second, the results of this study provide 
insights for policymakers, auditors, and academics related to several regulatory debates, 
particularly the debates over increasing audit market competition, audit firm rotation, and the 
provision of non-audit services. For example, to reduce the adverse impact of the provision of 
non-audit services on audit quality, my findings provide empirical evidence that although the 
provision of non-audit services reduces audit quality, increasing audit market competition 
mitigates the adverse effects by aligning auditors' interests with their principals (e.g., clients’ 
shareholders) and encouraging auditors who provide non-audit services to their clients to 
maintain their independence and ensure high quality in the audit. Thus, regulators may use the 
“increasing audit market competition” approach to reduce the adverse effects of non-audit 
services on audit quality. Turning to the issue of long auditor-client tenure, it is important for 
regulators to notice the negative moderating effect of competition on the negative association 
between long audit-client tenure and audit quality, another important finding of this study. 
Policies (e.g., mandatory audit rotation) aimed at increasing audit market competition that ignore 
the negative moderating impact of competition on audit quality and long audit-client tenure will 
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face challenges. A restriction on maximum tenure may be a key factor in reducing the negative 
moderating effects of competition when considering the adoption of mandatory audit firm 
rotation. In sum, my study shows the importance of understanding the moderating effects of 
audit market competition in different scenarios to help regulators make appropriate policy 
decisions. 
 Finally, this study provides evidence for the validity of the five most commonly used 
proxies for audit quality. The results suggest that ICW, GC, RESTATE, and SAC are good proxies 
for audit quality, while DAC is not. The findings suggest that extreme caution should be 
exercised when DAC is used to proxy for audit quality in future research.  
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 provides a 
literature review and hypothesis development; Chapter 3 introduces the sample selection and the 
research design; Chapter 4 provides data analysis and results; Chapter 5 shows additional 
analysis, and Chapter 6 concludes the paper.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Agency Theory and Audit Quality 
2.1.1 Definition of Audit Quality 
 DeAngelo (1981) provides a theoretical framework for audit quality and defines audit 
quality as the joint probability that an auditor will both discover and report material 
misstatements in the client's financial statements. The likelihood that an auditor will identify 
material misstatements can be considered a function of the auditor's competence, including 
experience, client-specific knowledge, and ability. While DeAngelo (1981) defines auditing 
quality as a binary process in that auditing will either succeed or fail in detecting material 
misstatements, DeFond and Zhang (2014) emphasize that audit quality is a continuous variable: 
an auditor considers not only whether the client's accounting choices and reporting comply with 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), but also how faithfully the financial 
statements reflect the firm's underlying economics. Thus, DeFond and Zhang (2014, page 281) 
define higher audit quality as "greater assurance that the financial statements faithfully reflect the 
firm's underlying economics, conditioned on its financial reporting system and innate 
characteristics.”  
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2.1.2 Agency Theory and the Demand for Audit Quality 
 Agency theory describes the relationship between a principal and an agent under which 
the agent performs some service on the principal's behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because of 
the misalignment of interests between principals and agents and information asymmetries, 
principals are concerned that agents may pursue their own self-interest at the expense of 
principals. To resolve these concerns, principals put into place mechanisms to align the interests 
of agents with those of principals and reduce information asymmetry and the opportunistic 
behavior of the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). 
Agency problems motivate clients to demand a high quality in the audit. The greater the 
agency costs, the higher the demand for high audit quality (Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995; 
DeFond, 1992; Francis & Wilson, 1988). Owners (principals) may discount the value of their 
initial investments and lower management compensation because of agency problems. Thus 
clients with greater agency problems are more likely to demand high audit quality to help reduce 
agency costs and thereby increase company value and management compensation (Francis & 
Wilson, 1988; DeFond, 1992). In addition, the client-specific quasi-rents that an incumbent 
auditor gains access to are subject to loss if the auditor is found to provide a lower-than-expected 
audit quality.  
 The possibility of the loss of reputation capital may prevent auditors from opportunistic 
behaviors. DeAngelo (1981b) as well as other audit researchers (Beatty, 1989; Dopuch & 
Simunic, 1982; Titman & Trueman, 1986) state that auditors in large audit firms have more 
incentive to maintain their independence and achieve higher quality to maintain their reputation. 
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Furthermore, litigation risk may also impact audit quality. While Datar, Feltham, and Hughes 
(1991) reason that high-risk clients demand higher audit quality, Simunic and Stein (1996) argue 
that audit quality decreases as client-specific risk increases, which generates high litigation risk.  
2.1.3 Measurement of Audit Quality 
 Audit quality is unobservable and thus difficult to measure. A number of proxies have 
been employed to measure it, for example financial reporting quality, particularly earnings 
quality (i.e. discretionary accruals), is commonly used because of the tight link between audit 
quality and financial reporting quality. However, there is a debate as to whether earnings quality 
is an appropriate proxy for audit quality. Proponents argue that earnings quality is conceptually 
suited for measuring audit quality because of their close links: auditors are required to evaluate 
within-GAAP manipulations (PCAOB, 2010), especially earnings manipulation, so detecting 
earnings manipulation is a relevant indicator of audit quality and the value of the audit to users is 
through accurate financial reporting. Such tight links between earnings reporting quality and 
audit quality have been supported in the literature. For example, Caramanis and Lennox (2008) 
find that when audit effort is low, abnormal accruals are larger and more frequent and firms are 
more likely to meet or beat zero earnings benchmarks. Also, Gunny and Zhang (2013) find that 
audit firm clients that received a deficient report, issued by the PCAOB if any audit deficiency is 
discovered, have significantly higher abnormal accruals and are more likely to have future 
earnings restatements.  
 Opponents, on the other hand, question the use of earnings quality to measure audit 
quality. In his review paper in audit research, Francis (2011) explicitly notes that earnings quality 
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metrics (e.g., discretionary accruals) may not an appropriate measure of audit quality because 
firms with a higher value of discretionary accruals measures do not necessarily imply that their 
financial statements are misstated. Also, earnings quality as a proxy for audit quality may not 
fully capture the quality of the auditor's execution of the audit process (Bell, Causholli, & 
Knechel, 2015). In addition, using earnings quality as a proxy may generate high measurement 
errors and even bias. DeFond and Zhang (2014) in their review of audit research indicate that 
discretionary accruals “is farther from the auditor’s influence and suffers from serious 
measurement issues… [Page 290].” For example, in using different estimation models and 
samples, average absolute discretionary accruals ranges from 4% to 10% of total assets, 
indicating the possibility of high measurement errors (Gul, Fung, & Jaggi, 2009). The debate 
over whether earnings quality is a great proxy for audit quality remains inconclusive. 
In addition to financial reporting quality, proxies widely used to measure audit quality are 
material misstatements, going-concern opinions, litigation, and internal control weaknesses. 
Material misstatements (i.e. restatements) and going-concern opinions issued by auditors provide 
clear and substantial direct evidence of the quality of the audit. For example, issuing a going-
concern opinion may directly improve auditor independence and audit quality. When auditors 
believe the client has a going-concern issue, managers of the firm have an incentive to pressure 
auditors to issue a clean opinion by indicating they may change audit firms. Resisting client 
pressure and keeping their independence to report a going-concern opinion may lead to higher 
audit quality. Internal control weakness opinions are also used to proxy for audit quality, but 
whether more adverse opinions on the effectiveness of internal controls represents "better" or 
"worse" audit quality remains inconclusive. Some suggest that finding weaknesses in a client's 
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internal controls indicates the thorough application of audit procedures and thus better audit 
quality. However, others argue that more adverse opinions on internal control weakness mean 
poor audit quality (Chan, Farrell, & Lee, 2008; Feng, Li, & McVay, 2009; Goh & Li, 2011). 
When audit firms aggressively gain market share, individual auditors are encouraged to stay with 
the firm and accept more clients, even high-risk clients that may have material internal control 
issues. Under such a scenario, such high-risk clients with material internal control weakness 
issues are more likely to have lower audit quality. In summary, several proxies are used to 
measure audit quality in the prior literature, but there is no consensus as to which measures are 
best and limited guidance on how to evaluate them (DeFond & Zhang, 2014).  
2.2 Auditor Independence and Audit Quality 
2.2.1 Agency Theory and Auditor Independence  
  Because external audits independently verify the work of agents, such audits are 
considered monitoring mechanisms designed to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, the employment of external auditors generates another 
agency relationship between the auditors (as agents) and the owner (as principals). Antle (1982) 
is one of the first to view auditors as economic agents of the principal. In his auditor-manager-
owner multiperson agency model, he proposes the auditor as an expected utility maximizer. As 
classic agency theory applies, auditors, like other agents, have their own incentives and motives, 
which leads to agency problems relating to auditor independence (Antle, 1982; Gjesdal, 1982).  
 The question of auditor independence is unavoidable when auditors are hired and paid by 
their clients (Antle, 1984; Baiman, Evans, & Noel, 1987). Audit firms, like other agents, have 
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their own interests that differ from those of their clients and they are motivated to maximize 
profits, even at the expense of their independence (Bazerman, Moore, Tetlock, & Tanlu, 2006). 
For example, an auditor may use a low-balling strategy to win a new client. As the auditor 
continues to provide services and becomes more familiar with the client, the incumbent auditor 
gains access to a “quasi-rent”, where the production cost of the audit decreases and audit fees 
usually increase (DeAngelo, 1981). Thus a stronger economic bond is created between auditors 
and their clients, making auditors less likely to report material misstatements they find in order to 
accommodate their clients (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002).  
 Also, since the 1980's, the trend has been for large accounting firms to merge with each 
other, resulting in a more concentrated audit market. Currently, the number of big accounting 
firms has decreased by half, from the Big 8 to the Big 4. These mergers demonstrate firms’ 
strategy to grow market share and generate profits (Ferguson, 2004; Zeff, 2003). The profit-
driven audit firm may put more pressure on auditors to keep current clients, bring in new clients, 
and sell non-audit services, which leads to impaired auditor independence. Both the too-close 
business relationship and the economic bond between auditors and clients may impair auditors’ 
independence and reduce audit quality. 
2.2.2 Auditor Independence and Audit Quality 
 Auditor independence includes independence both in fact and in appearance. That is, 
independence refers not only to a mental state of objectivity and lack of bias on the part of 
auditors but also to a reasonable investor’s perception of auditors’ capability of exercising 
objective and impartial judgment (SEC, 2000). Regulators are concerned that an enhanced 
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economic bond between auditors and their clients through the provision of non-audit services 
and long auditor-client tenure may impair auditor independence and lead to low audit quality. In 
November 2000, the United States (US) Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued 
auditor independence rules that require clients to disclose non-audit and audit related fees 
separately and also restrict particular types of non-audit services that auditors can provide (SEC, 
2000). Regulators have currently been considering adopting mandatory audit firm rotation in the 
US to reduce the adverse effects of long audit-client tenure on auditor independence.  
 Prior studies provide evidence supporting the direct association between auditor 
independence and audit quality. As the provision of non-audit services and long auditor-client 
tenure have been perceived as great threats to auditor independence, previous literature 
commonly used the provision of non-audit services and auditor-client tenure to proxy for auditor 
independence.  
2.2.2.1 The Impact of Non-audit Services on Audit Quality 
 As audit and non-audit fees have been publicly disclosed since 2001, a growing number 
of studies use audit fee data to investigate the relationship between audit quality and auditor 
independence as indicated by the provision of NAS, but the results are mixed (Beattie & 
Fearnley, 2002; DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Schneider, Church, & Ely, 2006). Frankel et al. (2002) 
find that providing NAS impairs auditor independence because auditors are more likely to 
acquiesce to client pressure (e.g., allow earnings management) to gain economic rent. Consistent 
with Frankel et al. (2002), a few studies find that a high level of NAS is associated with negative 
market action (Krishnamurthy, Zhou, & Zhou, 2006), a higher cost of debt (Dhaliwal, Gleason, 
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Heitzman, & Melendrez, 2008), a higher possibility of being sanctioned by the SEC for fraud 
(Markelevich & Rosner, 2013), and more litigation against auditors as well as large settlements 
(Eilifsen & Knivsfla, 2013; Schmidt, 2012). However, some studies do not find that the 
provision of NAS compromises auditor independence (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung & 
Kallapur, 2003; Reynolds, Deis, & Francis, 2004), through financial report quality (e.g., DAC) 
(Huang, Liu, Raghunandan, & Rama, 2007; Mitra, 2007), conservatism (Ruddock, Taylor, & 
Taylor, 2006), going concern opinion (Callaghan, Parkash, & Singhal, 2009; Geiger & Rama, 
2003), and restatement (Seetharaman, Sun, & Wang, 2011). Further, some studies even report 
the benefits of providing NAS: such as increasing audit efficiency, improving earnings quality, 
and shortening audit reporting lag, lowering information risk, and better prediction of future cash 
flows because of knowledge spillover and contractual economics (Simunic, 1984; 
Arrunada,1999; Knechel & Sharma, 2012; Koh et al., 2013; Nam & Ronen, 2012).  
 In summary, prior literature finds mixed evidence for the effect of the provision of non-
audit services on audit quality and two competing propositions are proposed to explain the 
conflicting results. On one hand, the provision of non-audit services may not adversely affect 
audit quality and could even improve audit quality as a result of the auditor’s deeper knowledge 
of the clients' business and knowledge spillover effects.  The other view proposed that providing 
non-audit services decreases audit quality because of auditors' high economic dependence on 
clients. Given the mixed evidence on the association between NAS and audit quality in the 
literature, I propose the following hypothesis, in null form, as follows. 
H1: The provision of non-audit services does not affect audit quality. 
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2.2.2.2 The Impact of Auditor-client Tenure on Audit Quality 
 Long auditor-client tenure is perceived as a threat to auditor independence. Regulators 
have serious concerns that long auditor-client tenure may reduce audit quality, as a close 
relationship developed through long auditor-client tenure may make auditors reluctant to 
jeopardize the significant revenue source from their clients and thus, be more likely to provide a 
less-rigorous audit and act in their clients’ interest (AICPA, 1978; PCAOB, 2011). Some 
research supports these concerns. Specifically, long-tenure auditors are associated with a higher 
perceived risk in auditing (Kealey, Lee, & Stein, 2007; Dao, Suchismita, & Raghunandan, 2008), 
poor earnings quality (Chi & Huang, 2005; Davis, Soo, & Trompeter, 2009), a higher possibility 
of meeting or beating benchmarks, and a lower propensity to issue a GC opinion (Carey & 
Simnett, 2006; Davis et al., 2009).  
 However, some research demonstrates that shortening auditors' tenure does not 
necessarily mean better quality of auditing, as evidenced by more audit reporting failures and 
higher audit costs (GAO, 2003; Arel, Brody, & Pany, 2005), an increase in auditors' legal risk, 
and more SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Action/Releases (AAER) received by 
auditors in a short auditor-client tenure, even in the early stages of auditor tenure (Carcello & 
Nagy, 2004; Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). Furthermore, some studies find that long auditor-
client tenure does not impair audit quality and may even improve it. Long auditor-client tenure 
allows auditors to gain a deeper familiarity with the client's business, develop their expertise, and 
thus provide a more efficient, less costly audit with higher quality. Clients may value such 
"tenured" auditors more highly, giving them more bargaining power and more ability to resist 
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client pressure and retain their independence (Shockley, 1981; Beck & Wu, 2006). The results of 
these studies demonstrate that longer auditor-client tenure is related to higher earnings response 
coefficients (Ghosh & Moon, 2005), lower cost of capital in the bond market (Mansi, Maxwell, 
& Miller, 2004), a higher level of conservatism (Li, 2010; Jenkins & Velury, 2008), and better 
earnings quality (Davis et al., 2009; Gul, Jaggi, & Krishnan, 2007; Johnson, Khurana, & 
Reynolds, 2002; Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2003).   
 Therefore, prior studies of the association between auditor-client tenure and audit quality 
remain inconclusive. On one hand, long auditor-client tenure may increase the quality of the 
audit because of client-specific knowledge and development of auditors' expertise. On the other 
hand, long auditor-client tenure may reduce audit quality, as a stronger economic bond 
developed through long auditor-client tenure may impair auditor independence and increase 
audit risk. Given the mixed evidence on the association between auditor tenure and audit quality 
in the literature, hypothesis 2 is proposed, in null form, as follows: 
H2: Audit firm tenure does not affect audit quality. 
2.3 Audit Market Competition and Audit Quality 
Since 1989, a series of mergers have occurred among the major audit firms, reducing the 
“Big 8” to the “Big 6,” then the “Big 5,” and finally the Big 4 after the demise of Arthur 
Andersen in 2002. The mergers among the Big accounting firms increased concentration in the 
audit market and resulted in more balance among Big accounting firms, but the gap between Big 
firms and non-Big firms is greater than ever (Wolk, Michelson, & Wootton, 2001; Wootton, 
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Tonge, & Wolk, 1994). Currently, Gerakos and Syverson (2015), who have developed an 
analytical model to estimate the effect of the exit of a Big audit firm, suggest that the exit of a 
Big 4 firm would cost client firms $1.4-$1.8 billion more for the same level of services, 
indicating that more audit market concentration (i.e. lower competition) leads to higher audit 
fees. Furthermore, two recent studies find that non-Big 4 local firms also affect audit market 
competition through audit fees in the US setting (Keune, Mayhew, & Schmidt, 2016; Bills & 
Stephens, 2015). Audit market competition has changed significantly over the last fifteen years, 
and only a few studies examine the mechanism of competition in the audit market, with 
inconclusive results.  
Spatial competition theory, representing competition among firms with differentiated 
products and regional diversification, is widely used in research to extend our understanding of 
competition in the audit market. Spatial competition theory focuses on "the locational 
interdependence among economic agents under the constraints of imperfect competition" 
(Biscaia & Mota, 2013, p.852). That is, companies compete for clients based on their local 
location in the same market. Hotelling’s (1929) analytical model is one of the most influential 
landmarks in spatial competition theory. He theorizes that sellers may choose to minimize 
customers' transportation costs in order to compete. Thus the optimal location in the marketplace, 
in addition to price, enables companies to gain market power and charge premiums. Following 
Hotelling (1929), Chan (1999) adapts Hotelling's spatial competition model using start-up costs 
and price discrimination to analyze the effect of start-up costs on auditing competition. Numan 
and Willekens (2012) propose a spatial competition measure to directly examine the impact of 
audit market competition through differentiation in audit price and find that audit market 
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concentration does not increase (but rather decreases) audit fees, whereas the distance between 
competing auditors does increase fees. In summary, spatial competition theory has been widely 
applied in the audit research to investigate the impact of lack of competition on audit services.  
2.3.1 The Direct Effect of Audit Market Competition on Audit Quality 
  Numerous theoretical work investigates the direction of the effect of audit market 
competition on productivity with ambiguous predictions. Theoretically, both positive and 
negative associations are possible. On the one hand, increased competition increases manager's 
incentives to increase productivity by reducing agency costs, which is referred to as the 
competition-monitoring view in this study. On the other hand, the competition-impairment view 
indicates that an increase in market competition lowers firms' profits and thus reduces incentives 
to exert effort and may increase risky actions. A large theoretical literature examines how market 
competition increases management's incentive to increase productivity by reducing agency costs. 
Hart (1983) compares two types of firms in his model: entrepreneurial firms that are owned and 
managed by the same person and thus do not have agency problem, and principal-agent firms 
that have agency costs due to separated ownership. He finds that when the market is competitive, 
principal-agent firms are more likely to increase efficiency. An increase in competition would 
increase productivity by reducing agency problems. In addition, Schmidt (1997) develops a 
model of the informational effects of market competition and shows that the optimal incentive 
strategy is a function of the degree of market competition. An increase in competition may 
reduce firms' profits, which may provide managers incentives to exert effort and thus increase 
efficiency. Further, Griffith (2001) provides supporting evidence that the increase in market 
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competition leads to an increase in efficiency and growth rates, and such increased efficiency 
only occurred in principal-agent firms. Competition plays an important monitoring role in 
reducing agency costs and thus can increase efficiency. Under this competition-monitoring view, 
when the audit market is more competitive, auditors have strong incentives to improve service 
quality to differentiate them from other competitors and keep their clients and are more likely to 
be independent (Kallapur et al., 2010; Newton et al., 2013).  
The competition-impairment view, however, states that competition reduces productivity 
by increasing agency costs and risk-taking. Keeley (1990) provides a theoretical framework that 
an increase in competition leads to a reduction in monopoly rents, which magnifying agency 
problems and increasing managers' incentives to take an extra risk. Based on Keeley (1990)'s 
framework, Allen and Gale (2000) develop a model of competition in the banking sector and find 
supporting evidence that competition increases manager's preference for risk because of reduced 
profits in the competitive market. The proposition that competition reduces productivity by 
increasing agency costs and risk taking can be applied in the audit market research. An increase 
in audit market competition reduces audit firms' profits and thus increases their preference for 
risk-taking, which encourages auditors to take on more risky clients, and makes auditors more 
likely to please the clients, resulting in lower audit quality (Boone et al., 2012; Francis et al., 
2013).  
A growing number of empirical studies have investigated the direct impact of audit 
market competition on audit quality, but the evidence is mixed. For example, using a US sample 
for the period from 2003 to 2009, Boone et al. (2012) find that audit clients are more likely to 
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meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts in a less-competitive audit market. In addition, in an 
international setting with 42 countries, Francis et al. (2013) provide cross-country evidence for a 
negative association between Big 4 competition and audit quality, indicated by accruals quality, 
the likelihood of reporting a profit, and timely loss recognition. Newton et al. (2015) examine the 
role of audit market competition on internal control opinion shopping and audit quality and find 
that greater competition is associated with a higher likelihood of internal control opinion 
shopping, resulting in lower audit quality. Most recently, Huang, Chang, and Chiou (2016) 
investigated the mediation effects of audit market concentration on audit fees and audit quality in 
the China setting. They find that audit market concentration has a direct negative effect on audit 
quality but an indirect positive effect on increased audit fees. In contrast, Kallapur et al. (2010) 
document that higher concentration (i.e. less competition) is related to higher audit quality, and 
Newton et al. (2013), using a US sample from 2000 to 2009, show that greater concentration (i.e. 
less competition) is associated with a lower probability of financial restatements.  
Therefore, given the competing theories and inconclusive results on the association 
between audit market competition and audit quality, I propose hypothesis 3, stated in null form, 
as follows: 
H3: Audit market competition does not affect audit quality. 
2.3.2 The Moderating Indirect Effects of Audit Market Competition  
 As both auditor independence and audit market competition link directly to audit quality, 
I expect that, in addition to a direct effect, competition affects audit quality indirectly through 
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auditor independence. Finance and economics theories has suggested that greater competition 
aligns the interests of agent and principal and reduces agency costs, reduces management 
slackness, and motivates managers to improve efficiency so that the company can survive 
(Machlup, 1967; Jensen, 1986; Jagannathan & Srinivasan, 2000; Bloom, Propper, Seiler, & Van 
Reenen, 2015; Chhaochharia, Grinstein, Grullon, & Michaely, 2016). Applying such a 
competition-monitoring view to audit research, Simunic (1984) explicitly states that the degree 
of competition is a crucial factor in the association between audit independence and audit 
quality. In other words, the relationship between auditor independence and audit quality depends 
on the level of audit market competition. Under a competition-monitoring view, auditors may 
have a greater motivation to maintain their reputation to differentiate themselves from other 
competitors and would be less likely to please their clients when audit market competition is 
intense. That is, audit market competition positively moderates the association between auditor 
independence and audit quality.  
 However, under a competition-impairment view, in a competitive market, auditors face 
more client-loss pressure, have less bargaining power, and thus are more likely to please their 
clients by compromising their independence, resulting in reduced audit quality (Beams & 
Killough, 1970; Shockley, 1981, 1982). If this is the case, competition has a negative moderating 
effect on the association between auditor independence and audit quality. Therefore, given the 
competing theories on the moderating effects of competition, I propose hypothesis 4, stated in 
null form: 
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H4: Audit market competition does not moderate the association between auditor 
independence and audit quality. 
H4a: Audit market competition does not moderate the association between NAS and 
audit quality. 
H4b: Audit market competition does not moderate the association between audit firm 
tenure and audit quality. 
Figure 1 displays the theoretical model, through which my hypotheses and constructs are 
operationalized. Based on the previous literature, I propose a theoretical model to test whether 
audit market competition moderates the association between audit quality and auditor 
independence, indicated by the provision of non-audit services and auditor-client tenure. The 
linkages in the model depict the four hypotheses proposed above.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
3.1 Sample 
Testing of the model was achieved using data from reputable secondary databases.  I 
obtain financial information from Compustat Industrial Annual files to measure two of the 
variables used in the main model: competition and discretionary accruals (DAC). Audit fee data, 
auditor information, and other audit-related data are obtained from Audit Analytics. I also hand 
collect security class action data from the Stanford Law School Security Class Action 
Lighthouse website (http://securities.stanford.edu/filings.html). The sample starts in 2004 
because the internal control weakness data used in the study is publically available only since 
2004. Thus, the sample period is from 2004 to 2014. My initial sample for constructing the 
measurement model consists of 110,025 firm-year observations. I exclude 49,405 observations in 
financial industries (SIC code between 6000 and 6999) because the regulations in those 
industries substantially differ from those in other industries. I also remove observations whose 
Compustat data are not available. Finally, after removing observations with missing values for 
discretionary accruals and the other four indicators of audit quality, the proposed measurement 
model sample is significantly reduced, to 26,391 observations.  
As the results of the proposed measurement model show that DAC is not significantly 
related to the latent variable audit quality, I drop DAC and construct the revised measurement 
model. The sample selection process for the revised measurement model and the structural model 
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are explained as follows. Similar to the sample selection in the proposed measurement model, I 
start with 110,025 firm-year observations for all U.S. public companies whose audit fees and 
other audit-related information are available in Audit Analytics, and then exclude 49,405 
observations in financial industries (SIC code between 6000 and 6999). Additionally, I exclude 
observations with missing data required for variables. Similar to other studies in audit market 
competition (Francis et al., 2005; Numan & Willekens, 2012), I also exclude observations in the 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) for each year in which there are fewer than three auditors, to 
ensure that local audit firms can compete for clients. Thus, the final sample for the structural 
model in the study is 56,719 firm-year observations for the period between 2004 and 2014. 
Finally, to mitigate the effects of outliers, I winsorize all the continuous variables at the one 
percent and the ninety-nine percent levels of their distribution. The sample selection criteria for 
both the measurement model and the structural model are presented in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
3.2 Using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to Test the Hypothesized Relationships  
3.2.1 The Advantages of Using SEM  
SEM is a group of statistical methods that allows simultaneous analysis of a series of 
structural equations. SEM provides the ability to conduct a more robust test of hypotheses and 
offers many advantages over other techniques (e.g., multiple regression and path analysis) 
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(Smith & Langfield-Smith, 2004). The power of SEM makes it an increasingly popular 
methodology to test theoretical models in social science research. One important advantage of 
SEM is the ability to construct latent variables and check the relations between latent and 
observed variables. A latent variable is defined as an unobserved concept that can only be 
approximated by observed variables; therefore, a latent variable usually is constructed from 
several indicators (observed variables) (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006).  
SEM usually consists of two models: the measurement model and the structural model. 
The measurement model uses confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to measure the loading of each 
indicator on the latent variable and evaluate the reliability of the measurement of the latent 
variable and then incorporates the degree of reliability (i.e. specified measurement error 
variances) into the structural model. Therefore, SEM helps to provide unbiased estimates in the 
model by providing explicit estimates of error variance parameters and controlling for 
measurement errors, while other traditional multivariate procedures do not (Byrne, 2001). SEM 
is particularly useful to validate theoretical models by providing several measures of model fit to 
inform whether the model fits the data well. Furthermore, SEM provides many different 
estimation techniques to overcome the multivariate normality violations. Therefore, the 
combination of simultaneous tests of measurement reliability and structural relations, the ability 
to account for measurement error and other advantages over multiple regression techniques 
makes SEM a more appropriate method used in the study to test the proposed hypotheses. I use 
MPlus software program in the study, with default maximum likelihood, to estimate the SEM 
model.  
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3.2.2 The Measurement Model and the Structural Model in the SEM 
I use structural equation modeling (SEM) to test hypothesized relationships between the 
constructs (see Figure 1). SEM consists of a measurement model and a structural model and is 
commonly a two-step procedure. The first step is to examine the measurement model. I develop 
a construct of audit quality indicated by five commonly used proxies for audit quality: 
discretionary accruals (DAC), going concern opinions (GC), restatements (RESTATE), securities 
class action filings (SCA), and internal control weaknesses (ICW). Then I use confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) embedded in a structural equation model to evaluate the validity of the construct 
of audit quality. The coefficient loading of the measurement model demonstrates the contribution 
of each indicator measure to the latent variable, audit quality. If the coefficient loading of an 
indicator of the latent variable is not significant, it suggests that the indicator does not capture the 
variable well and should be dropped from the measurement model. 
After the measurement model is satisfied, a structural model that includes all proposed 
associations among observed variables and latent variables will be tested. As depicted in Figure 
1, the structural model shows the links from auditor independence indicated by NAS and auditor-
client tenure to audit quality, the direct link from audit market competition to audit quality, and 
the moderating effects of audit market competition on such links. After both the measurement 
model and the structural model are created, SEM simultaneously examines both the 
measurement model and the structural model.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
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3.3 Measures of Variables 
3.3.1 Measures of Audit Quality 
To measure audit quality in the study, I construct a latent variable, audit quality, in the 
measurement model, as indicated by the five most widely used proxies: DAC, ICW, GC, 
RESTATE, and SAC. The measurement model fit indices and results on the construct of audit 
quality provide clear evidence of the validity of the construct of audit quality and which proxies 
are better proxies.  
In the construct of audit quality, discretionary accruals (DAC) as an indicator of audit 
quality is estimated based on the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. Specifically, DAC 
is computed using the following regression:  
TCAi,t = σ0 + σ1CFOi,t-1+ σ2CFOi,t+ σ3CFOi,t+1+ σ4ΔRevenuei,t + σ5PPEi,t+ εi,t   
The modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model incorporates the primary variables from 
Jones (1991): change in revenue (ΔRevenuei,t) and the amount of property, plant, and equipment 
(PPEi,t). The residual from estimating the model represents discretionary accruals that do not 
map into lagged (CFOi,t-1), current (CFOi,t), and future cash flows (CFOi,t+1) after controlling for 
a change in revenue and property, plant, and equipment (PPE). 
The other four indicators of audit quality are dummy variables defined as follows. GC 
equals one if a firm receives a going-concern opinion during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
RESTATE is also a dummy variable and equals one if a firm restates its financial statement 
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during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. The third indicator is SCA, which equals one if a firm 
has a securities class action filing during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. The last indicator, 
ICW, equals one if a firm receives an internal control weakness report during the fiscal year, and 
zero otherwise. 
3.3.2 Measures of Auditor Independence 
As the provision of non-audit services and long auditor-client tenure have been perceived 
as main threats to auditor independence because of close economic bonds created between 
auditors and their clients, the provision of non-audit services and auditor-client tenure are widely 
used as proxies for auditor independence (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). In the study, I employ both 
the provision of non-audit services and auditor-client tenure as proxies to measure auditor 
independence. Auditor-client tenure (TENURE) is measured as the length of the auditor-client 
relationship in years. The provision of non-audit services (NASRT) is calculated as the ratio of 
non-audit fees to total fees paid to the audit firm in each fiscal year.  
3.3.3 Measures of Audit Market Competition 
Although a few studies use the Herfindahl index concentration measure as a proxy of 
competition, the auditing literature acknowledges its limitation and argues that high levels of 
concentration do not necessarily represent lower competition intensity (Dedman & Lennox, 
2009; Numan & Willekens, 2012; Bills & Stephens, 2016). However, Numan and Willekens’ 
(2012) measure of audit market competition is more appropriate and common, as spatial 
competition theory (Hotelling, 1929) is applied to measure audit market competition as audit 
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firm's market share relative to the market share of its competitors in the same local market 
(Metropolitan Statistical Area [MSA]). Therefore, in the study, I employ Numan and Willekens' 
(2012) measure as the primary measure for audit market competition and use the Herfindahl 
index concentration measure in the robustness analysis.  
Two primary measures of audit market competition are used in the analysis. The first is 
DISTANCE_MSA, defined as the smallest absolute difference of audit fee market share between 
the incumbent auditor and its closest competition within its MSA. The second measure is 
DISTANCE_IND, calculated as the same difference of audit fee market share within an MSA-
industry market. In the models, all measures of audit market competition are multiplied by (-1), 
so that the higher the results, the stronger audit market competition.  
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CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
The sample distribution is presented in Table 2. Panel A shows the year-by-year 
distribution of the final sample. As each year contains 8 to 10 percent of the sample firms, the 
sample distribution is even across years. Panel B of Table 2 shows the sample distribution based 
on the Fama-French 12-industry classification. Approximately 20 percent of the observations 
come from the Business Equipment industry and 15 percent from the Healthcare, Medical 
Equipment, and Drugs industries, while only 2 percent come from Consumer Durables and 3 
percent from Chemicals and Allied Produces. 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables in my analysis. The average 
absolute market share distance between an incumbent auditor firm and its closest competitor in 
the MSA-industry market (DISTANCE_IND) is 22 percent, which is comparable to the mean 
value reported by Numan and Willekens (2012). The average of market share distance in the 
MSA market is only 6 percent. These results indicate that audit market competition varies across 
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city-year and city-industry-year groups. In addition, the mean value of audit fee is $1,312,262, 
and the mean non-audit services fees is $326,018. The average (median) ratios of non-audit fees 
to total fees (NASRT) are 13 (8) percent, indicating that a significant amount of the fees is earned 
through audit firms’ non-audit services. The average of an audit firm's tenure is 7.46 years, 
suggesting that many auditor firms have a long tenure. In my sample, 7,623 going-concern 
opinions are observed, comprising about 13 percent of the total sample. Further, about 19 percent 
of firms restated their financial reporting because of errors or a change of estimation within the 
sample period, 3 percent of firms received an internal control weakness opinion (ICW), and 2 
percent of the observations have a security class action filing (SAC). Details of variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlations between the variables in the study. Both of the 
two primary audit market competition measures, DISTANCE_MSA, DISTANCE_IND, and an 
alternative measure, the Herfindahl index HERF (defined in the Chapter 5.2.1), are highly 
correlated with each other. All three measures of audit market competition are negatively 
correlated with NAS and TENURE. This provides univariate evidence supporting that 
competition increases auditor independence by reducing NASRT and TENURE. The largest 
correlation among variables exists between DISTANCE_MSA and TENURE, with the coefficient 
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of -0.221. In addition, the primary measure of non-audit services (NASRT) is highly correlated 
with its alternative measure LNNAS (introduced in the Chapter 5.2.2) about 60 percent. Further, 
the four proxies of audit quality are significantly correlated with each other. For example, GC is 
negatively correlated with ICW, RESTATE, and SAC, while ICW, RESTATE, and SAC are 
positively correlated with each other. The correlations between the other variables are not high, 
suggesting multicollinearity is not a concern in the study.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
4.2 Tests of the Proposed Measurement Model 
The primary SEM analyses included two steps. First, the proposed measurement model is 
tested to determine whether it is an acceptable fit to the data through confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA). Once an acceptable measurement model is derived, the structural model is used to 
examine the proposed hypotheses. Three commonly used indices are used to assess the goodness 
of fit of the models: The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit 
index (CFI), and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI). An RMSEA of less than 0.08 and TLI and CFI 
close to 1 are considered to indicate a good fit in the SEM (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). The results of structural equation modeling (SEM), including both the 
measurement model and the structural model, are discussed below. 
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Figure 2 and Table 5 Panel A represent the model fit results of the proposed measurement 
model, in which the latent variable, audit quality (AQ), is indicated by five variables: DAC, GC, 
SAC, RESTATE, and ICW. Both CFI (0.998) and TLI (0.994) are close to 1, and RMSEA (0.012) 
is less than the 0.08 threshold, suggesting a good fit in the proposed measurement model. 
However, in the proposed measurement model, the factor loading of discretionary accruals 
(DAC) is not significant, indicating that DAC is not an adequate indicator to measure the latent 
variable AQ and should be dropped from the model. Thus, the proposed measurement model is 
modified by dropping DAC from the AQ construct in the model.  
Consistent with the concerns about using earnings quality to measure audit quality, my 
findings show that DAC is not significantly related to audit quality. Recently, in their review 
paper, DeFond and Zhang (2014) point out that earnings quality (e.g., discretionary accruals) 
proxies are less-direct measures of audit quality since auditors' influence on reporting quality is 
extremely limited. Consistent with DeFond and Zhang (2014), Bell et al. (2015) suggest that 
earnings quality may not adequately reflect the quality of the auditor's execution of the audit 
process. Furthermore, earnings quality proxies may generate high measurement error and even 
bias (Gul et al., 2009; Defond & Zhang, 2014). Overall, my results provide supporting evidence 
that earnings quality (e.g., discretionary accruals) may not capture audit quality well. 
After dropping the indicator DAC from the proposed measurement model, the modified 
measurement model includes four indicators (GC, RESTATE, SAC, and ICW) to measure the 
latent variable, AQ. Figure 3 and Panel B of Table 5 present the standardized path coefficients 
and model fits of the modified measurement model. The modified measurement model fits the 
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data well, as evidenced by a CFI of 0.992, a TLI of 0.975 and an RMSEA of 0.012, and all 
individual factor loadings from each indicator on the latent construct, AQ, are statistically 
significant at p < 0.001. The results of these fit indices demonstrate that the modified 
measurement model reasonably fits the data and that the latent variable, audit quality, appears to 
be adequately measured by these four indicators.  
Table 5 Panel B shows that ICW has the highest absolute factor loading, -0.911, among 
the four indicators, followed by SAC (-0.461), RESTATE (-0.416), and GC (0.186). This result 
implies that ICW is the best indicator of audit quality. In addition, the path loadings from ICW, 
RESTATE, and SAC on audit quality are negative, indicating that weak audit quality is associated 
with companies’ receiving an internal control weakness opinion, or restating their financial 
reports, or being the target of a security class action filed by investors. The results provide 
evidence for the unclear relations among audit quality and its proxies. For instance, to 
aggressively expand their market share, audit firms may adopt a risk-maximization strategy and 
pressure auditors to accept or retain clients with material internal control weaknesses and high 
probability to liquidate or restate their financial statements. Under such a situation, more material 
internal control weakness opinions, restatements or security class action filings indicate that 
auditors have higher risk customers and their audits are more likely to be lower in quality. 
Therefore, the negative associations between ICW, RESTATE, and SAC and audit quality found 
in the paper is consistent with such proposition. 
As may be expected, the factor loading from GC to the audit quality construct is positive, 
which is consistent with one proposition in the prior literature. When auditors consider issuing a 
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going-concern opinion, clients may put pressure on auditors to issue a clean opinion. Under 
pressure, auditors’ choosing to keep their independence and insisting on issuing a going-concern 
opinion indicates a higher quality of auditing. Thus, going-concern opinions issued by auditors 
are positively associated with audit quality, which is similar to the result found in this study.  
In summary, these findings from the confirmatory factor analysis show that the revised 
measurement model is a good fit for the data and provide evidence of the validity of four proxies 
of audit quality. Among the five indicators of audit quality, DAC does not capture audit quality 
well, while the other four indicators (GC, RESTATE, SCA, and ICW) are able to measure audit 
quality well, and ICW is the best proxy. Furthermore, audit quality is positively associated with 
GC and is negatively associated with RESTATE, SCA, and ICW. 
 
 [Insert Table 5, Figure 2, and Figure 3 Here] 
 
4.3 Tests of the Effects of Auditor Independence on Audit Quality (H1-H2) 
After the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is used to provide evidence as to whether 
the measurement model fits the data and to assess the reliability of constructs and indicators, a 
structural model is used to test the proposed theoretical model, i.e., the hypothesized causal 
relationships among auditor independence, audit quality, and audit market competition. The 
procedures used to assess the structural model fit are similar to those performed in the 
measurement model. The results of the fit indices generated by Mplus software are reported in 
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Table 6 and Figure 4. CFI and TLI are 0.989 and 0.981, respectively, which are close to 1. In 
addition, RMSEA is 0.016 and below the cutoff of 0.08. These model fit indices suggest that the 
model provides a good fit to the data. Table 6 and Figure 4 reports the standardized path 
coefficients that specify the hypothesized causal relationships. 
Hypothesis 1 states, in null form, that non-audit services (NASRT) do not affect audit 
quality (AQ). Similarly, Hypothesis 2 predicts that a long auditor-client tenure (TENURE) does 
not affect audit quality (AQ). The path coefficients from NASRT to AQ and from TENURE to AQ 
are central to these two hypothesis tests, respectively. As Table 6 and Figure 4 show, both path 
coefficients are negative and significant at p <0.001. The results suggest that both non-audit 
services and long auditor-client tenure reduce audit quality. As both non-audit services and long 
auditor-client tenure are viewed as threats to auditor independence and used to proxy for auditor 
independence in the study, the results provide supporting evidence that auditor independence is 
positively associated with audit quality. The findings are consistent with statements in the prior 
literature that both the provision of non-audit services and long audit tenure create a strong 
economic bond between auditors and their clients, which makes auditors more likely to 
compromise their independence to please their clients, resulting in reduced audit quality (SEC, 
2000; Frankel et al., 2002; Carey & Simnett, 2006; Kealey et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2009; 
Schmidt, 2012). Thus, null hypotheses H1 and H2 are rejected.  
4.4 Tests on the Direct Effects of Audit Market Competition on Audit Quality (H3) 
Hypothesis 3 in null format proposes that audit market competition (COMPET) does not 
affect audit quality (AQ). As shown in Table 6 and Figure 4, the path coefficient from COMPET 
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to AQ is positive (0.558) and significant at the p < 0.001 level, suggesting that more audit market 
competition improves audit quality. The findings confirm long concerns from regulations and 
researchers that lack of competition in the audit market makes auditors more likely to become 
overconfident and they have fewer incentives to improve audit quality (Boone et al., 2012; 
Francis et al., 2013). Two primary measures of audit market competition (COMPET) are used in 
the study: DISTANCE_MSA and DISTANCE_IND; the results of both are consistent in the 
structural model. Thus, audit market competition does increase audit quality, so Hypothesis 3 is 
rejected.  
4.5 Tests on the Moderating Effects of Audit Market Competition (H4) 
Hypothesis 4, the moderating role of audit market competition on auditor independence 
and audit quality, is proposed in a null format. Hypothesis 4a predicts that audit market 
competition does not moderate the association between the provision of non-audit services and 
audit quality. As Table 6 reports, the significant positive path coefficient of 0.051 (p <0.001) 
indicates that COMPETE moderates the relationship between NASRT on AQ. The findings 
suggest that audit market competition positively affects the association between NASRT and AQ; 
that is, audit market competition mitigates adverse effects of the provision of non-audit services 
on audit quality. The results support the premise of competition as a monitoring mechanism and 
suggest that a more competitive audit market better aligns interests between auditors and 
company shareholders and gives auditors more incentives to provide better quality in both non-
audit and audit services through client-specific knowledge spillover and improved independence. 
Therefore, H4a is rejected.  
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H4b focuses on the moderating effect of audit market competition on audit quality and 
auditor independence, using long auditor-client tenure (TENURE) as a proxy for auditor 
independence. As shown in Table 6, the path coefficient from the moderating interactive term 
COMPETE on the link between TENURE and AQ is negative and significant at the p <0.001 
level. The results demonstrate that as audit market competition increases, long auditor-client 
tenure negatively affects audit quality to an even greater extent. The finding is consistent with 
the proposition in the prior literature that more competition increases auditors' dependence on 
their clients if they believe clients are more likely to replace them with new auditors (Beams & 
Killough, 1970; Shockley, 1981, 1982). Thus, H4b is also rejected.  
The results of this study show opposite moderating effects of audit market competition on 
the association between NASRT and AQ and between TENURE and AQ. These opposite 
moderating effects may co-exist and can be explained as follows. First, although both the 
provision of non-audit services and auditor-client tenure are used to proxy for audit quality, they 
are different in nature. Audit services are mandated by regulators, while the provision of non-
audit services are not. Compared to non-audit service, audit service is the core business of the 
audit firm and audit fees remain the biggest revenue resource for the audit firm. For example, 
audit fees average is 1.3 million dollars per engagement year during the sample period between 
2004 and 2014, which is about four times the average NAS fees. Thus, auditors have more 
pressure and incentives to maintain their auditing services versus non-audit service in a more 
competitive market. Second, compared to non-audit service, switching auditors generates 
significant costs for both incumbent auditors and clients. Studies suggest that switching auditors 
is perceived by investors as a negative sign of audit quality, and the punishment, such as higher 
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cost of capital and lower earnings response coefficients, is costly (Mansi, et al. 2004; Ghosh & 
Moon, 2005). In addition, clients who change their auditors are required to get approval from the 
audit committee and promptly disclose the change to the SEC via the 8-K form. Furthermore, 
consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981) quasi-rent theory, it may cost more for clients to use new 
auditors than incumbent auditors because of start-up costs and the increased number of hours 
invested by auditors in learning the client's business and obtaining client-specific information. 
Thus, even in a competitive audit market, switching auditors is not an optimal option for clients, 
who are then more likely to pressure the incumbent auditor to issue a clean audit opinion, 
resulting in impaired auditor independence and reduced audit quality.  
On the other side, competition increases incumbent auditors' fear of client loss since 
competition makes it harder to find new clients and maintain profit levels. Also, auditors may 
need to spend more time and effort learning about the new client's business while receiving a 
lower audit fee due to a low-balling strategy. Even though incumbent auditors can find new 
clients in a more competitive market, the profit margin from a new client is smaller than that 
from an old client. Therefore, when the audit market is more competitive, incumbent auditors are 
more likely to compromise in order to keep clients, impairing independence and reducing audit 
quality. In summary, the different nature of non-audit service versus auditor-client tenure results 
in audit market competition having a different moderating effect on the relationship between 
NAS and audit quality than on the relationship between auditor-client tenure and audit quality.  
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 4 Here] 
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CHAPTER 5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Additional Analysis of the Indirect Effects of Audit Market Competition 
Beyond the direct and moderating indirect effects of audit market on audit quality have 
been supported in the primary study, audit market competition may influence audit quality 
indirectly through auditor independence. Under the competition-monitor view, greater 
competition aligns auditors' interests with those of their principals and thus enhances auditor 
independence, resulting in a higher level of audit quality. In contrast, with more competition, 
auditors are more likely to compromise their independence to please their clients, which reduces 
auditor independence and thus leads to lower audit quality, consistent with the competition-
impairment view. That is, in a competitive audit market, audit quality would increase through 
enhanced auditor independence or decrease through impaired auditor independence (Kallapur et 
al., 2010; Newton et al., 2013; Boone et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2013). Therefore, I employ 
structural equation modeling to further examine how audit market competition indirectly 
influences audit quality.  
The theoretical model for the indirect effects of audit market competition on audit quality 
is presented in Figure 5. The variables and SEM methodology are the same as those used in the 
moderating model of the primary analysis. The results of the structural model are presented in 
Table 7 and Figure 6.  
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[Insert Table 7, Figure 5 and Figure 6 Here] 
 
As evident in Table 7, the model fit statistics are acceptable, indicating support for my 
theoretical model of the indirect effect model. The GFI at 0.977 is close to 1, the TLI is 0.956, 
and the RMSEA is 0.045, which is less than 0.08. The results in Table 7 show that audit market 
competition is positively associated with audit quality, but both NAS and auditor-client tenure 
are negatively related to audit quality, which is consistent with the findings of the moderation 
model in the main analysis of this study. The negative and significant coefficients indicate that 
competition directly reduces NAS and tenure. Further, the indirect effects of audit market 
competition on audit quality through both NAS and auditor-client tenure are significant and 
positive. In addition to the direct positive effect of audit market competition on audit quality, the 
results suggest that a competitive audit market also indirectly increases audit quality through 
enhancing auditor independence, as evidenced by reducing the provision of NAS by auditors or 
shortening auditor-client tenure. The results further explain why and how the relationship 
between audit market competition and audit quality exists, and provide supporting evidence for 
the monitoring mechanism of audit market competition.  
5.2 Alternative Measures of Variables in the Analysis 
5.2.1 Alternative Measures of Audit Market Competition 
I use the Herfindahl index as an alternative measure of audit market competition in the 
robustness tests. Since using the Herfindahl index concentration measurement has the limitation 
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that high levels of concentration do not necessarily mean lower competition intensity (Dedman 
& Lennox, 2009; Lennox, 2012; Numan & Willekens, 2012; Bills & Stephens, 2016), caution 
should be exercised when explaining the results based on the Herfindahl index measure of audit 
market competition. The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the squares of each audit 
firm's market share of audit fees earned from clients within MSA-year groupings; it is calculated 
as follows.  
 
 
where,  
N = the total number of audit firms in the MSA;  
si = the size of audit firm i, measured as total fees earned by the audit firm from public company 
clients in the MSA during the year; and 
S = the total size of the audit market in the MSA; that is, the total fees earned by all audit firms in 
the MSA during the year.  
Similar to GAO (2008) report, the median of variable HERF is -0.26 reported in Table 3, 
suggesting an uncompetitive audit market. I also report the results of using alternative measures 
of audit market competition in Table 8. Overall, the results based on the Herfindahl index are 
qualitatively similar to those from the two primary measures of audit market competition in 
Table 6. The direct effect of audit market competition on audit quality is positive and 
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insignificant. However, the moderation effects show that competition has a positive moderation 
effect on the association between the provision of non-audit services and audit quality, but a 
negative moderation effect on the association between auditor-client tenure and audit quality, 
which is consistent with my main findings when using the primary measures of audit market 
competition.  
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
5.2.2 Alternative Measures of Non-audit Services (NAS) 
As non-audit services are sometimes also calculated in the literature as the natural log of 
the total amount of non-audit services fees, LNNAS, I test the robustness based on the alternative 
measure of non-audit services, LNNAS. Table 9 presents the results of the alternative measure, 
LNNAS, in the structural model. The results are qualitatively similar to the main findings using 
the non-audit service fee ratio (NASRT) as the primary measure of non-audit services.  
 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
5.2.3 The Measurement Model based on Alternative Measures of Discretionary Accruals 
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To test the robustness of my findings with respect to the measure used to calculate 
discretionary accruals, I perform the same analysis in the measurement model using alternative 
measures of discretionary accruals. Specifically, I calculate an alternative discretionary accruals 
measure, DAP, based on the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model (Kothari et al., 
2005):  
Accrualsi,t = σ1(1/Assetsi,t-1) + σ2ΔSalesi,t + σ3PPEi,t + σ4ROA + εi,t 
Where Accruals is the total accruals; Assets is the total assets of each firm; ΔSales is the change 
in sales between year t-1 and t; PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment; and ROA is the 
return on assets. DAP is calculated as the deviation of total accruals from the modified Jones 
model (2005) predicted values. 
After calculating the alternative discretionary accruals, DAP, I use the DAP measure as 
well as the other four proxies, GC, ICW, RESTATE, SAC to construct the latent variable, audit 
quality, in the proposed measurement model. Table 10 shows the results of the proposed 
measurement model based on the alternative measure of discretionary accruals – DAP. 
Consistent with the results from the DAC measure in Table 5, the standardized factor loading 
from DAP to audit quality is not significant, and thus may be dropped from the proposed 
measurement model. Overall, the results based on the alternative measure of discretionary 
accruals are qualitatively similar to my main results.  
 
[Insert Table 10 Here]  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigates both direct and indirect effects of audit market competition on 
audit quality through auditor independence in the United States. I find that competition has a 
significant and positive direct impact on audit quality. In addition, both NAS and audit firm 
tenure have adverse effects on audit quality, which is consistent with investors' perception that 
both the provision of non-audit services and long audit firm tenure are threats to auditor 
independence and result in lower audit quality. 
Next, I test two competing theories from the competition literature on how audit market 
competition indirectly affects audit quality through auditor independence. First, I find that audit 
market competition positively moderates the association between the provision of non-audit 
services and audit quality, consistent with the competition-monitoring proposition. These results 
suggest that audit market competition as a monitoring mechanism enables the alignment of 
auditors' interests with those of principals during the provision of non-audit services to their 
clients, which provides auditors more incentive to keep their independence and gain reputation 
capital, resulting in higher audit quality. Second, regarding the auditor-client tenure issue, the 
results show that long auditor-client tenure is related to lower audit quality and such adverse 
effects on audit quality may be worse in a more competitive market, which is consistent with the 
competition-impairment view. That is, auditors have an increased fear of client loss in a more 
competitive market and more economic dependence on their clients, which makes auditors more 
likely to compromise their independence to please their clients. Therefore, two opposite 
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moderating effects of audit market competition may co-exist through different factors: non-audit 
services and long auditor-client tenure. Regulators who consider policies aimed at increasing 
audit market competition should pay attention to the co-existence of the opposite moderating 
effects of market competition on audit quality through auditor independence, such as audit firm 
tenure and non-audit services. Furthermore, the additional analysis examines the indirect effects 
of audit market competition on audit quality and the results show that audit market competition 
increases audit quality indirectly through improving auditor independence. Overall, the findings 
of the analysis of the indirect effects of audit market competition provide insightful evidence for 
future policy decision-making and call for careful consideration of regulatory policies for 
increasing audit market competition.  
This study also provides evidence of the validity of five commonly used proxies for audit 
quality. Given the outstanding advantages of its ability to construct latent variables and control 
for measurement errors over regression and other multivariate methodology, structural equation 
modeling (SEM) is used in the study to evaluate audit quality proxies and simultaneously 
investigate both direct and indirect effects of audit market competition. I find that internal 
control weakness is the best proxy for audit quality among the five commonly used proxies. 
However, the findings show that discretionary accrual (DAC) is not significantly associated with 
the latent variable audit quality, indicating that caution should be used when employing DAC as 
a proxy for audit quality in future research.  
This study should benefit and interest policy makers, practitioners, and academics, as it 
provides valuable insights into the recent debates about audit market competition, the provision 
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of non-audit services, and mandatory auditor rotation. My findings suggest that, in general, 
competition has direct positive effects on audit quality, which supports regulators' concerns 
about a lack of competition in the audit market. An understanding of the co-existent opposite 
moderation effects of audit market competition on audit quality is essential for regulators to 
make good decisions regarding regulatory policy. For example, because of the negative 
moderating effect of competition on tenure and audit quality, a restriction on the upper bound of 
audit tenure would eliminate the negative moderating effect of audit market competition, 
resulting in higher audit quality. 
This study also has implications for academic research. The study examines the validity 
of the five most-widely-used proxies of audit quality, and the findings provide guidance as to 
which proxies are good measures of audit quality and may be useful in future research. 
Additionally, my study provides evidence that audit market competition has both direct and 
indirect effects on audit quality through auditor independence and suggests that researchers may 
need to include audit market competition as an independent variable and a moderating variable 
when examining audit quality.  
The study has limitations that may provide opportunities for future research. First, as the 
data for private U.S. companies is not publicly available, I am unable to directly identify the 
private company audit market, which makes the measures of industry market shares less 
accurate. It is more severe in small audit markets than in big audit markets since small audit 
firms may have more private clients. Second, endogeneity may be a concern in the study, since 
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there is a strict causal relationship between audit quality and competition measured by the market 
shares distance. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variables   Definition 
Measures of audit market competition (COMPET): Two primary measures are used to 
measure audit market competition: DISTANCE_MSA and DISTANCE_IND. HERF is also used 
as alternative measure of audit market competition in the study.  
 
DISTANCE_MSA 
 
The smallest absolute difference of audit fee market share 
between company i's incumbent auditor and its closest audit firm 
competition within its MSA. Market share is based on audit fees, 
which are from Audit Analytics data base. In addition, the 
measure is multiplied by (-1) in the study; that is, the higher the 
result, more intensive audit market competition.  
    
 
DISTANCE_IND 
 
The smallest absolute difference of audit fee market share 
between company i's incumbent auditor and its closest audit firm 
competition within an MSA-industry market. The measure is 
multiplied by (-1) in the study. 
    
 
HERF 
 
The Herfindahl index concentration measure is calculated as the 
sum of the squares of each audit firm's market share of audit fees 
earned from clients within MSA-year groupings. The measure is 
multiplied by (-1) in the study. 
        
Measures of indicators of audit quality (AQ): audit quality (AQ) is constructed as a latent 
variable, indicated by five proxies: DAC, GC, SCA, ICW, and RESTATE. 
 
DAC 
 
Discretionary accruals equals the deviation of total accruals from 
the predicted values of the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model: TCAi,t = σ0 + σ1CFOi,t-1+ σ2CFOi,t+ σ3CFOi,t+1+ 
σ4ΔRevenuei,t + σ5PPEi,t+ εi,t  
where TCA is total accruals and calculated as net income before 
extraordinary items minus operating cash flows; CFO is 
operating cash flow; ΔRevenue is the change of revenue from 
year t-1 to t; PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment.  
    
 
GC 
 
1 if company i received a going concern opinion in year t, 0 
otherwise. 
    
 
SCA 
 
1 if company i had a security class action filed in year t, 0 
otherwise. 
    
 
ICW 
 
1 if company i had an internal control weakness in year t, 0 
otherwise. 
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(Continues)  
 
Variables   Definition 
 
RESTATE 
 
1 if company i restated its financial statements in year t, 0 
otherwise. 
  
DAP 
  
Alternative measure of discretionary accruals is based on the 
modified Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005): Accrualsi,t = 
σ1(1/Assetsi,t-1) + σ2ΔSalesi,t + σ3PPEi,t + σ4ROA + εi,t  
where Accruals is the total accruals; Assets is the total assets for 
each firm; ΔSales is the change of sales between year t-1 and t; 
PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment; ROA is return on 
assets. DAP is calculated as the deviation of total accruals from 
the model predicted values.  
Measures of proxies for auditor independence:  the provision of non-audit services (NASRT) 
and auditor-client tenure (TENURE) are proxies for auditor independence. LNNAS is an 
alternative measure of the provision of non-audit services. 
 
NASRT 
 
The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the audit firm in 
year t. 
    
 LNNAS  Natural log of total non-audit fees paid to the audit firm in year t.  
    
 TENURE  The length of the auditor-client relationship in years. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model 
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Figure 2. The Proposed Measurement Modeling of Audit Quality 
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Figure 3. The Modified Measurement Model of Audit Quality 
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Figure 4. Standardized Path Coefficients of the Moderation Model 
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Figure 5. Theoretical Model of the Indirect Effect Model 
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Figure 6. Standardized Path Coefficients of the Indirect Effect Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TENURE 
COMPET 
NASRT 
Audit Quality 
(AQ) 
-0.133*** 
-0.249*** 
0.340*** 
-0.173*** 
-0.341*** 
 
58 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection 
Audit Analytics firms during 2004-2014 110,025 
Exclude firms from regulated/financial industries (SIC 6000-6999) (49,405) 
Exclude firms where Compustat data are not available  (8,444) 
Exclude firms missing data required for variables  (25,785) 
Sample for the Proposed Measurement Model 26,391 
  
Audit Analytics firms during 2004-2014 110,025 
Exclude firms from regulated/financial industries (SIC 6000-6999) (49,405) 
Exclude firms missing data required for variables (1,926) 
Exclude firms in the MSA where have less than three auditors each year (1,922) 
Final Sample for the Structural Model 56,719 
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Table 2. Sample Distribution 
Panel A: Year Distribution      
Sample           
Year  Obs.  %  
2004   5,841   10.30%   
2005  5,796  10.22%  
2006  5,854  10.32%  
2007  5,730  10.10%  
2008  5,453  9.61%  
2009  5,225  9.21%  
2010  5,008  8.83%  
2011  4,852  8.55%  
2012  4,706  8.30%  
2013  4,539  8.00%  
2014   3,715   6.55%   
Total   56,719   100.00%   
      
Panel B: Industry Distribution      
            
Industry  Obs.  %  
1. Consumer nondurables (food, textiles, etc.)   3,056   5.39%   
2. Consumer durables (furniture, appliances, etc.)  1,647  2.90%  
3. Manufacturing  5,095  8.98%  
4. Energy  3,942  6.95%  
5. Chemicals and allied produces  1,855  3.27%  
6. Business equipment (computers, software)  11,522  20.31%  
7. Telephone and TV transmission  2,036  3.59%  
8. Utilities  2,303  4.06%  
9. Wholesale, retail and other service  6,342  11.18%  
10. Healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs  8,392  14.80%  
12. Others (mines, construction, hotels, etc.)   10,529   18.56%   
Total   56,719   100.00%   
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
                      
Variable   Mean  Std. Dev.  25%  Median  75% 
NAS fees  326,018  1,311,708  1,000  29,763  198,300 
Audit fees  1,312,262  3,183,413  64,482  388,819  1,301,260 
Total fees  1,638,281  4,213,618  74,000  460,600  1,559,250 
NAS_RT  0.13  0.15  0.01  0.08  0.21 
LNNAS  8.16  5.31  1.6  10.30  12.20 
TENURE  7.46  7.24  2.00  5.00  10.00 
DISTANCE_IND -0.22  0.33  -0.28  -0.04  -0.002 
DISTANCE_MSA -0.06  0.11  -0.06  -0.10  -0.0001 
HERF   -0.30   0.11   -0.32   -0.26    -0.24 
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Table 4. Pearson Correlation among Explanatory and Dependent Variables  
Variable DISTANCE_MSA   DISTANCE_IND   HERF   NAS_RT   LN_NAS   TENURE   GC   RESTATE   SAC   ICW 
DISTANCE_MSA 1.000                   
                    
DISTANCE_IND 0.427***  1.000                 
 <0.001                   
                    
HERF 0.465***  0.481***  1.000               
 <0.001  <0.001                 
                    
NAS_RT -0.099***  -0.046***  -0.024***  1.000             
 <0.001  <0.001  <0.001               
                    
LNNAS -0.272***  -0.151***  -0.026***  0.634***  1.000           
 <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001             
                    
TENURE -0.221***  -0.159***  -0.063***  0.108***  0.335***  1.000         
 <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001           
                    
GC 0.268***  0.150***  0.034***  -0.205***  -0.508***  -0.297***  1.000       
 <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001         
                    
RESTATE -0.009**  0.009**  0.006  0.024***  0.037***  -0.003  -0.033***  1.000     
 0.031  0.040  0.174  <0.001  <0.001  0.4992  <0.001       
                    
SAC -0.033***  -0.014***  0.010*  0.025***  0.074***  0.027***  -0.065***  0.060***  1.000   
 <0.001  0.0006  0.0182  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001     
                    
ICW -0.033***  -0.008*  0.007*  -0.011**  0.074***  0.015***  -0.076***  0.135***  0.138***  1.000 
 <0.001  0.058  0.0801  0.0112  <0.001  0.0002  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001   
 Notes: *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Standardized Loadings and Reliabilities for the Measurement Model 
Panel A: The proposed measurement model for audit quality indicated by five variables 
Measured       Standardized     
 variable  Indicators   factor loading  P- Value 
Audit Quality  DAC  0.016  0.289 
  GC   0.144***  0.000  
  RESTATE   -0.406***  0.000  
  SAC   -0.449***  0.000  
  ICW   -0.955***  0.000  
       
Goodness-of-fit Indices for the Measurement Model   
RMSEA 0.012      
CFI 0.998      
TLI 0.994      
              
       
       
Panel B: The modified measurement model for audit quality indicated by four variables 
Measured       Standardized     
 variable  Indicators   factor loading  P- Value 
Audit Quality  GC   0.186***  0.000  
  RESTATE   -0.416***  0.000  
  SAC   -0.461***  0.000  
  ICW   -0.911***  0.000  
       
Goodness-of-fit Indices for the Measurement Model   
RMSEA 0.012      
CFI 0.992      
TLI 0.975      
        
1) *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
2) RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-
Lewis Index. 
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Table 6. Moderation Effects of Audit Market Competition on Audit Quality 
Model 
   Model 1   Model 2   
Competition Measure  DISTANCE_MSA  DISTANCE_IND  
Effect 
    Coef.  p-value   Coef.  p-value   
Standardized Direct Effect         
 NASRT -> AQ  -0.123 <0.001  -0.14 <0.001  
 TENURE -> AQ  -0.368 <0.001  -0.403 <0.001  
 COMPET -> AQ  0.558 <0.001  0.097 <0.001  
         
Standardized Moderation Effect        
 
Competition moderation effect on 
NASRT ->AQ  0.051 <0.001  0.025 <0.001  
 
Competition moderation effect on 
TENURE -> AQ  -0.306 <0.001  -0.037 <0.001  
         
Goodness-of-fits indices        
 RMSEA  0.016 <0.001  0.015 <0.001  
 CFI  0.989 <0.001  0.978 <0.001  
  TLI   0.981 <0.001   0.962 <0.001   
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Table 7. Additional Tests: Bootstrap Analysis of Indirect Effects of Audit Market Competition  
Model     Model 1   Model 2 
Competition Measure  DISTANCE_MSA  DISTANCE_IND 
Effect     Coef.  p-value   Coef.  p-value 
Standardized Direct Effect        
 NASRT -> AQ  -0.126 <0.001  -0.191 <0.001 
 TENURE -> AQ  -0.249 <0.001  -0.377 <0.001 
 COMPET -> AQ  0.405 <0.001  0.075 <0.001 
        
Standardized Indirect Effect       
 COMPET -> NASRT -> AQ  0.012 <0.001  0.009 <0.001 
 COMPET -> TENURE -> AQ  0.055 <0.001  0.060 <0.001 
        
95% CI (lower-upper)  lower upper  lower upper 
 COMPET -> NAS_RT -> AQ  0.008 0.014  0.007 0.011 
 COMPET -> TENURE -> AQ  0.034 0.061  0.054 0.066 
        
Goodness-of-fits indices       
 RMSEA  0.045   0.047  
 CFI  0.977   0.946  
  TLI   0.956     0.898   
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Table 8. Robustness Test: Alternative Measure of Audit Market Competition in the SEM 
Model       
Competition Measure  HERF 
Effect     Coef.  p-value 
Standardized Direct Effect     
 NAS_RT -> AQ  -0.132 <0.001 
 TENURE -> AQ  -0.496 <0.001 
 COMPET -> AQ  0.01 0.105 
     
Standardized Moderation Effect    
 Competition moderation effect on NAS_RT ->AQ  0.049 <0.001 
 Competition moderation effect on TENURE -> AQ  -0.031 0.044 
     
Goodness-of-fits indices    
 RMSEA  0.011 <0.001 
 CFI  0.962 <0.001 
  TLI   0.935 <0.001 
 
  
 
 
66 
 
Table 9. Robustness Tests: Alternative Measure of Non-audit Services in the SEM 
Alternative Measure (LNNAS)   Model 1   Model 2 
Competition Measure  DISTANCE_MSA  DISTANCE_IND 
Effect     Coef.  p-value   Coef.  p-value 
Standardized Direct Effect        
 LNNAS -> AQ  -0.432 <0.001  -0.485 <0.001 
 TENURE -> AQ  -0.325 <0.001  -0.364 <0.001 
 COMPET -> AQ  0.569 <0.001  0.089 <0.001 
        
Standardized Moderation Effect       
 
Competition moderation effect on 
LNNAS ->AQ  -0.054 <0.001  0.067 <0.001 
 
Competition moderation effect on 
TENURE -> AQ  -0.269 <0.001  -0.071 <0.001 
        
Goodness-of-fits indices       
 RMSEA  0.021 <0.001  0.018 <0.001 
 CFI  0.969 <0.001  0.966 <0.001 
  TLI   0.946 <0.001   0.941 <0.001 
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Table 10. Robustness Tests: Using Alternative Measure of DAC in the Measurement Model 
 
Measured       Standardized     
 variable  Indicators   factor loading  P- Value 
Audit Quality  DAP  -0.028  0.143 
  GC   0.154***  0.000  
  RESTATE   -0.485***  0.000  
  SAC   -0.565***  0.000  
  ICW   -0.785***  0.000  
       
Goodness-of-fit Indices for the Measurement Model    
RMSEA 0.013      
CFI 0.987      
TLI 0.957      
              
1) *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
2) RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-
Lewis Index. 
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